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Abstract
A large body of empirical work has established the signicance of cash ow in explain-
ing investment dynamics. This nding is further taken as evidence of capital market
imperfections. We show, using a perfect capital markets model, that time-to-build
for capital projects creates an investment cash ow sensitivity as found in empiri-
cal studies that may not be indicative of capital market frictions. The result is due
to mis-specication present in empirical investment-q equations under time-to-build
investment. In addition, time aggregation error can give rise to cash ow eects inde-
pendently of the time-to-build eect. Importantly, both errors arise independently of
potential measurement error in q. Evidence from a large panel of U.K. manufacturing
rms conrms the validity of the time-to-build investment channel.
JEL classi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1 Introduction
Investment in xed capital is one of the most important and volatile components of aggregate ac-
tivity. Understanding investment dynamics is central to the study of aggregate uctuations. In the
neoclassical theory of rm investment with adjustment costs, the rm's market value and invest-
ment respond simultaneously to signals about future protability as encoded in Tobin's q. In this
theory, Tobin's q, dened as the expected value of the rm relative to its capital stock becomes a
summary statistic for investment. Nevertheless, despite its theoretical appeal the empirical perfor-
mance of the q theory has been rather disappointing. In contrast to the predictions of the theory,
various measures of internal funds such as prots or cash ow are signicant in explaining corporate
investment and the responsiveness of investment to fundamentals is weak. This sensitivity of in-
vestment to internal funds is further taken as evidence of capital market imperfections that disturb
the rm's investment schedule from the frictionless neo-classical benchmark. This paper uses a
neoclassical investment-q model with time-to-build and time-to-plan features for capital and revis-
its this evidence. We provide a new explanation for the emergence of cash ow eects in empirical
investment-q equations that relies on an important technological aspect of capital production.
Time-to-build and time-to-plan are key technological features of investment. A variety of survey
(Montgomery (1995) and Koeva (2000)) and rm level (Koeva (2001), Del Boca et al. (2008))
evidence suggests that these technological constraints are important at the rm level. This evidence
indicates that the time required for the installation of new equipment and structures ranges from 3
to 4 quarters for equipment and 2 to 3 years for non-residential structures. But as we demonstrate in
this paper, the typical investment-q equation that serves as the benchmark for evaluating the capital
market imperfections hypothesis, is usually not robust to the presence of time-to-build investment.
When time is required to build new capital q is no longer a sucient statistic for investment. This
result arises because under time-to-build an additional state variable signicantly aects optimal
investment decisions. Investment consists of new and partially-nished projects that have not yet
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become productive capital. In addition to q the sum of current expenditures on existing incomplete
projects belongs to the right hand side of the investment regression. In other words, when the rm
decides|on the basis of new information about future investment opportunities|how many new
projects to initiate, past projects already under way inuence that decision, i.e. they constitute a
state variable for this decision. The perfect capital markets model we use allows us to characterize
this state variable analytically and show how it induces specication error in the typical investment-
q equation. More importantly, we show this state variable is strongly correlated with cash ow and
thus when not included among the right-hand-side variables of the regression, induces a positive
investment cash-ow sensitivity that is nevertheless not indicative of capital market imperfections.
We use the model to calibrate and simulate an industry to the aggregate U.S. manufacturing
sector. The specication error we identify renders q an insucient summary statistic is the primary
driver of cash ow eects in our simulated investment-q regressions. Our results closely corroborate
ndings recently reported in Eberly et al. (2008) although (as explained below), in contrast to theirs,
our ndings are free of measurement error in q. Nevertheless as we demonstrate, measurement error
magnies the specication error we identify. Further, our model provides an explanation for the
emergence of lagged investment eects in empirical investment-q regressions, in addition to cash-
ow eects. The importance of lagged investment eects is a largely overlooked empirical regularity,
since most of empirical work focuses almost exclusively on the role of cash ow. But as Eberly
et al. (2008) note: \Both cash-ow and lagged-investment eects have been found in virtually every
investment regression specication and data sample." In our study|as in Eberly et al. (2008)|we
show that the lagged investment rate is an important determinant of current investment because
it proxies for an omitted state variable. In Eberly et al. (2008) simulations, lagged investment
proxies for a regime-switching component in a rms' demand schedule. In the present model with
time-to-build, lagged investment has a dierent structural interpretation, capturing time-to-build
eects for the construction of capital.
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We further investigate whether our model can reproduce cross sectional dierences in investment
cash-ow sensitivities reported in the majority of empirical studies that test for capital market
imperfections (see for e.g. Fazzari et al. (1988), Gilchrist and Himmelberg (1995), and the survey by
Hubbard (1998)). These studies nd that rms which are thought a-priori to be more vulnerable
to imperfections in capital markets, e.g. small, young, with no dividends payout rms, exhibit
higher investment cash ow sensitivities compared to rms that are thought to have ample access
to external nance, e.g. large, old, dividend distributing rms. We show that the model is capable
of reproducing this empirical regularity as long as the former group of (constrained) rms have
longer time-to-build investment schedules compared to the latter group of (unconstrained) rms.
For this purpose we bring to light evidence from large samples of U.S. (Compustat) and U.K.
(Datastream) manufacturing rms that strongly suggests constrained rms to have longer time-to-
build investment schedules compared to unconstrained rms.
The presence of mis-specication under time-to-build begs the question of whether and how
we can mitigate it when undertaking empirical work within the q framework. We show that we
can approximate the omitted state variable with two readily available variables, namely the lagged
investment rate and the growth rate of the capital stock. We evaluate the usefulness of this ap-
proximation for empirical work in our simulated environment and nd that it performs almost
as well as its theoretical counterpart, nearly eliminating the cash ow eect from the investment
regression. We then test the predictions of the theoretical model in a large panel of U.K. man-
ufacturing rms and nd results that are remarkably consistent with the proposed time-to-build
channel. When we include the two variables above as right-hand-side regressors in the empirical
investment-q equations we nd a signicant improvement in the t of the regression equations.
More importantly, the inclusion of these controls nearly eliminates both the cash ow sensitivity
of investment and the cross sectional dierence in the cash ow coecients. Finally, independently
of the time-to-build eect above we show that a cash ow eect can emerge in an investment-q
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equation when researchers estimate an investment-q regression using annual data|a practice fol-
lowed in the majority of studies|that are aggregated from more frequent factor input decisions.
This time or temporal aggregation error has been highlighted in the context of capital and labor
adjustment cost estimates by Hall (2004) but as far as we know the implications in an investment-q
framework have not been explored.
Recent work by Erickson and Whited (2000), Gomes (2001), Cooper and Ejarque (2003), Alti
(2003), Cummins et al. (2006), Abel and Eberly (2003), also cast doubt on the validity of investment
cash ow sensitivities as an indicator of capital market imperfections. Erickson and Whited (2000),
Gomes (2001) and Cummins et al. (2006) stress that cash ow eects may arise because Tobin's q is
measured with error. Cooper and Ejarque (2003) emphasize market power that creates a divergence
between average and marginal q while in Alti (2003) Tobin's q is a noisy measure of fundamentals
and cash ow is highly informative about long-run protability. Finally, in Abel and Eberly (2003)
cash ow eects arise as a result of specication error induced by changes in the user cost of capital.
Yet, our contribution is rather dierent from all the above. First, in time-to-build, we provide a new
and important channel for the emergence of signicant cash ow eects in investment-q regressions.
Importantly, this channel receives considerable support from the data. Second, in contrast to the
studies above our ndings do not involve any mis-measurement between average and marginal q
and thus are not driven by measurement error.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model. Section 3 discusses
the solution and calibration. In section 4 results from the simulated version of the model are
presented. Section 5 concludes.
2 The Model
We use a model developed in Tsoukalas (2003) suitable for analyzing rms investment decisions
in a time-to-build environment. A similar framework has been employed by Zhou (2000) to ex-
plain aggregate investment dynamics. The following subsections explain the components that are
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essential to the framework.
2.1 Firms
2.1.1 Technology
We model an industry which is populated by a continuum of risk-neutral innitely-lived rms. Firm
j produces output, using the following decreasing returns to scale Cobb-Douglas technology:1
yjt = At!jtF (Kjt;Mjt; Ljt) = At!jtK

jtM

jtL

jt  + +  < 1
where At is an aggregate (common) and !jt an idiosyncratic productivity shock. Kjt is capital, Ljt
is the labor input and Mjt is the stock of materials.
The investment technology requires time to build new capital. Specically, it takes J-periods
(stages) to build new productive capacity. This technology implies that in any given period t,
rms initiate new projects, sJt, and complete partially nished projects, sit, i 6= J at stage i.
This assumption intends to capture the design and construction (delivery) stages that exist in
undertaking investment projects in plant and equipment as suggested by Kydland and Prescott
(1982). The assumptions of this time-to-build (TTB) technology are summarized below:
sit = si 1;t+1 i = 2; :::J (2.1)
Kt+1 = (1  )Kt + s1t (2.2)
It =
JX
i=1
'isit (2.3)
with 0  'i  1; i = 1; 2; :::J , and
PJ
i=1 'i = 1. To clarify notation, sJt denotes new projects at
time t, sJ 1;t denotes projects initiated at time t  1, that are J   1 periods away from completion
1Decreasing returns to scale are necessary for rm size to be well dened. Otherwise rm size is indeter-
minate and the entrepreneurial sector reduces to just a single producer.
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at time t, and so on. The last stage project, s1t yields productive capital in the following period.
The parameters 'i determine the xed fraction of resources allocated to projects that are i periods
away from completion, or equivalently the proportion of the value of the project put in place in
period i. It denotes total investment expenditures at time t and depends on the resources expended
for the dierent incomplete projects. Finally, the capital stock depreciates at rate .
New investment projects are subject to adjustment costs. It is assumed that rms face a
quadratic cost of adjustment function for investment in new projects, i.e.,
G(sJ;jt;Kjt) =

2
(
sJ;jt
Kjt
  )2Kjt (2.4)
where the parameter  governs the curvature of G.2 This function has all the usual properties,
i.e., it is convex, with a rising marginal adjustment cost. It also implies a zero adjustment cost in
the steady state.
2.1.2 The rm's problem
The rm chooses new investment projects, sJ;jt, materials orders, djt, and labor input, Ljt, in order
to maximize rm value:
max
Ljt;sJ;jt;djt
E0
1X
t=0
tdivjt
where divjt denote dividends. To conserve space a detailed description of the maximization problem
is described in Appendix 1. Re-arranging the rst order necessary condition for new projects, sJ;jt
and assuming that projects require 3 periods for completion (i.e. J = 3) gives the equation for
optimal investment rate:
Ij;t
Kj;t
= '3

  1

('3 + '2 + 
2'1) + 

+ '3
1

2Et(qj;t+2) +
2X
i=1
'i
si;jt
Kj;t
(2.5)
Optimal investment is a function of future expected marginal q (i.e. the shadow value of installed
capital), reecting the fact that capital will become productive with a lag and an additional state
2An alternative characterization of the adjustment cost function is to assume that the cost is paid at
the time when resources on projects are expended, i.e., G(s1;jt; :::sJ;jt;Kjt) =
PJ
i=1 'i

2 (
si;jt
Kjt
  )2Kjt. We
choose to work with the simpler form (2.4) because of the analytical simplicity. We have experimented with
this alternative adjustment cost function with very similar results.
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variable that represents part of the investment outlays already underway. Thus in this environment
q ceases to be a sucient statistic for investment.
3 Solution
The equilibrium of the model is characterized by a set of Euler equations along with the Kuhn-
Tucker conditions for the equality constraints and the given initial values for the state variables.
This equilibrium is a set of non-linear equations and an analytical solution is infeasible to compute.
An approximate solution is calculated by using a second order approximation method around the
non-stochastic steady state of the model. The second order Taylor approximation, as described
in Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2004), can be readily used to calculate the decision rules for new
projects, materials orders and labor. Appendix 1 describes the essential computational details of
the solution.
3.1 Calibration
We calibrate the model using a baseline set of parameter values described in Table 1 using quarters
as the time unit. We calibrate the parameters needed to simulate our model to several characteristics
of the U.S. manufacturing sector. Appendix 2 reports in detail the various sources we have used for
the calibration exercise. We briey comment on the calibration of the TTB technology (i.e. values
for 'i's) since this is the key element of the model and the focus of this study. In the baseline
calibration we assume that an equal amount of spending takes place over three quarters, namely
'1 = '2 = '3. A body of empirical evidence supports this assumption. In the robustness section
4.5, we also consider several dierent values for the time-to-build technology given evidence from
various countries that suggest an unequal pattern of spending over the life of capital projects.
4 Results
In this section, we present results from the calibrated version of the model. The (approximate)
decision rules for the model's variables are simulated and articial data are generated. Using the
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articial data we create a panel of rm level data. We generate a panel of 1000 rms observed over
20 years and demonstrate that a signicant cash-ow eect can arise even in a model with perfect
capital markets.
4.1 Investment-q regressions
In this section we use the articial panel to estimate investment-q regressions augmented with
cash ow. We note that empirical studies, typically rely on annual rm level (e.g. Compustat or
Datastream) data, whereas our model is calibrated quarterly. We rst present brief results to build
intuition using our quarterly model and then aggregate our model to correspond to the annual
frequency. This allows to study the role of time aggregation.
To demonstrate the inference-problem associated with reduced form investment equations under
TTB, we estimate an OLS regression on the articial data,
Ij;t
Kj;t
=  + b1Et(qj;t+2) + b2
j;t
Kj;t
+ "j;t (4.1)
where the left-hand-side (LHS) variable is the investment rate, and the right-hand-side (RHS)
variables are the expected marginal q along with the prot rate and j indexes rms. Expected
marginal q is the correct statistic for capturing future investment opportunities under TTB because
new investment projects become productive after three periods (see equation 2.5). This is a typical
empirical investment equation except that Tobin's q is usually taken as a proxy for the un-observed
marginal q. A notable exception is Gilchrist and Himmelberg (1995) who construct a proxy for
marginal expected q. We also note that a typical empirical equation also includes a rm specic
eect. In our model however rms can only dier in the history of shocks they receive so there is not
any ex-ante rm-specic heterogeneity. We contrast this equation with the investment equation
2.5 and note that (ignoring the constant and error term) the correct specication under TTB
includes
P2
i=1 'i
si;jt
Kj;t
as a RHS variable. This sum is the part of investment that has responded
to old information (about productivity) and is therefore a state variable. The question is whether
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omitting this variable invalidates the inference drawn on the role of prots from an empirical
equation like (4.1). The answer is armative if the prot rate is correlated with
P2
i=1 'i
si;jt
Kj;t
. This
turns out to be the case with persistent productivity shocks.3 The intuition is as follows. Suppose
that at some time in the past a favorable productivity shock caused a surge in new projects. As
time elapses these new projects come closer to completion time and if the shock is persistent then
at time t there will be a series of outstanding projects, s1ts2t; :::; sJ 1;t. Moreover with persistent
shocks current prots will also reect the same past productivity shocks that caused the rm to
initiate new projects and are now exactly those projects above that have moved closer to completion.
Therefore current prots are correlated with each of these previous capital projects and hence their
sum. This implies that prots will proxy for this state variable in an investment-q regression. Of
course if q was a sucient statistic for total investment (it is a sucient statistic only for new
projects, sJt) then prots would not be signicant in a regression with investment and q. Table 2
reports the results from estimating equation (4.1) on our articial panel of rms. We can observe
that the prot rate coecient, b2 is positive and statistical signicant, even though our model was
designed without capital market imperfections. Therefore, the prot rate appears as a signicant
variable and improves the t of the equation as it proxies for a relevant omitted RHS variable. It
is also important to stress that any role for this variable in these regressions does not arise as a
result of measurement error since we are using the appropriate (marginal) measure of q. Instead
the explanatory role of the prot rate arises as a result of specication error due to TTB for
investment.4
4.2 Quantifying specication and time aggregation error
In this section we have two goals. First, to explore whether time aggregation can spuriously assign a
role to cash ow independently of the specication error that is created as a result of TTB. Second,
3To conserve space we present a set of correlations in Table 4. For the case examined here the correlation
between the two series is equal to 0.83.
4As expected, if we estimate the correct specication (2.5) we nd no role for the prot rate. We do not
report these results for brevity but they are available upon request.
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to investigate precisely how the TTB specication error generalizes in the annual framework. We
therefore aggregate our articial data to correspond to the same annual measures used in empirical
studies and make the investment equations directly comparable. We highlight two ndings: (i) we
identify a time aggregation error that can give rise (independently from the specication error due
to TTB) to cash ow eects in investment regressions with annual data and (ii) we demonstrate
that the TTB specication error generalizes in the annual environment.
We re-estimate the empirical investment equation specied in section 4.1 in the annual envi-
ronment (for convenience we drop the rm-specic subscript j), for J = 1; 2; 3; 4: Here as in the
previous section J refers to TTB in quarters, so the maximum length for the construction of capital
we consider is one year.
Iat
Kat
=  + b1q
a
t + b2
at
Kat
+ "at (4.2)
4.2.1 Time aggregation error
In Appendix 3 we discuss in detail the aggregation of the model to the annual frequency and char-
acterize the error that arises in this environment. The important insight is that time aggregation
gives rise to a non-zero term in the investment regression that is correlated with the prot rate.
This implies a small (but signicant) cash ow eect when this term is omitted from the regres-
sion. Table 3 reports the results from estimation of (4.2). Note that adding the prot rate to the
regression yields a positive and statistical signicant b2 coecient (bottom panel). To illustrate
the role of time aggregation in producing a cash ow eect we focus on the J = 1 case. We note
from Table 2 that for J = 1 in the quarterly model, ( tKt ) has no explanatory power. This follows
from the fact that for J = 1 there is no investment outlay that refers to a decision taken previously
(sJt = ::: = s1t = It) and hence no omitted RHS state variable. Even though the prot rate will be
correlated with investment rates, its forecasting role for future investment opportunities is properly
accounted for by marginal q. Thus any role for the prot rate in Table 3 in the J = 1 column
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can be solely attributed to the time aggregation error which gives rise to an extra term equal to
1
Kat
P4
k=1
It;k
Kt;k
Kt;k  
P4
k=1
It;k
Kt;k

, that is correlated with the prot rate and hence generates a
small positive prot rate coecient as explained above.
4.2.2 Specication error
On the other hand, the specication error that arises due to the TTB nature of investment can
be seen by examining the rst order condition (FOC) for optimal investment when J > 1. For
example, summing the FOC for optimal investment (where k = 1; 2; 3; 4 indicates quarters) over
quarters for J = 3 we get,
 4('3 + '2 + 2'1)  
 4X
k=1
(
s3t;k
Kt;k
  )

+ 2
4X
k=1
Ekqt;k+2 = 0
which after straightforward manipulations and using (2.3) we can write as,
 '3('3 + '2 + 2'1)  
4
 4X
k=1
(
It;k
Kat
  )

+

4

1
Kat
4X
k=1
It;k
Kt;k
Kt;k  
4X
k=1
It;k
Kt;k

+

4
4X
k=1
P2
i=1 'isit;k
Kt;k
+ 2'3
P4
k=1Ekqt;k+2
4
= 0
Re-arranging this equation to bring
Iat
Kat
on the left hand side of the equation we nally arrive
at,
Iat
Kat
= constant+

1
Kat
4X
k=1
It;k
Kt;k
Kt;k  
4X
k=1
It;k
Kt;k

+
4X
k=1
P2
i=1 'isit;k
Kt;k
+ '3
1
a
2qat (4.3)
where we have used,
P4
k=1
It;k
Kat
=
Iat
Kat
and qat =
P4
k=1 Ekqt;k+2
4 . This is the annual counterpart to
equation (2.5) and we see that there is an additional RHS variable that reects the TTB technology
in this version as well. This is given by
P4
k=1
P2
i=1 'isit;k
Kt;k
which is a summation (over quarters per
year) of the omitted state variable in equation (2.5), i.e. a linear combination of the latter. The
annual prot rate, (
at
Kat
), will be the sum of the corresponding quarterly rates and it will be correlated
with this state variable since both are sums of the corresponding quarterly measures. Therefore
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since the prot rate is correlated with the key omitted state variable and the investment rate (see
Table 4, lower bottom) regressing
Iat
Kat
on qat and the prot rate will result in a statistical signicant
role for the latter. But this is merely reecting the omission of an explanatory variable from the
RHS of the regression.5 Since in our model capital markets are perfect, any role for prots must
result from this mis-specication.
4.2.3 Incorrect inference in the investment-q regression under TTB
We now discuss the results reported in Table 3. In the top panel we demonstrate the incorrect
inference drawn for the magnitude of the adjustment cost parameter, a (imposing b2 = 0). Us-
ing the estimated coecient on q as the basis for obtaining an estimate of the adjustment cost
parameter|i.e. computing a = 1b1 , a practice typically followed in the literature|would lead a
researcher to infer an estimate considerable higher compared to the true value. Note that in this
case the magnitude of the overestimation of a ranges from roughly 7% for J = 1 to 22% for J = 4
(top panel, Table 3). Thus lengthier time-to-build technology produces adjustment cost estimates
that imply slower adjustment speeds for capital. The reason for the incorrect inference based on
the coecient of q is the fact that the true coecient of the latter is scaled by 'J (see equation
4.3) and thus the estimated regression coecient is an amalgam of 'J and 
a. Therefore as 'J falls
with the length of the TTB so does b1, the regression coecient on q. The source of this overesti-
mation lies in the fact that in this simple investment-q framework it is not possible to separately
identify the TTB parameters and the adjustment cost parameter from the estimated coecient on
q.6 Interestingly, Barnett and Sakellaris (1999) and Del Boca et al. (2008) using US and Italian
annual rm level data respectively, provide evidence consistent with our ndings, reporting signi-
5The estimated coecients in Table 3 reect both the time aggregation and specication error. However,
the former's contribution to the b2 estimates for J > 1 is extremely small. This can be shown by usingP4
k=1
It;k
Kt;k
instead of
Iat
Kat
as the LHS variable in (4.3) thus eliminating the aggregation error. The resulting
estimated coecients are nearly identical to those shown in Table 3 and are not reported but are available
upon request.
6We can also examine the true bias in the q coecient this regression framework generates in the hypo-
thetical case that a researcher knows the true values of the TTB parameters. This information is summarized
in the Appendix on inference and biases under TTB investment. We note in this case there is an upward bias
in the q coecient (equivalently a downward bias in the magnitude of a) due to the fact that the expected
value of b1 moves in proportion with the coecient of the omitted variable (see Appendix 3).
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cantly lower adjustment cost parameter estimates when TTB investment is allowed for. While our
results suggest a potential explanation for the reported low q estimates in the literature there is
one caveat. This is due to the fact that empirical work uses Tobin's q instead of the unobserved
marginal q. Thus it is not straightforward to compare our simulated results with empirical ndings.
As Erickson and Whited (2000) demonstrate measurement error in q will also lead to coecient
estimates that are biased towards zero.
We now focus on the role of cash ow in this TTB environment which is the main goal of this
study. The bottom panel of Table 3 includes the prot rate as an additional RHS variable. Two
ndings are worth noting. First, augmenting the regression with the prot rate generates a positive
and statistically signicant coecient on the latter. Second, and more importantly the inclusion
of the prot rate improves the t of the equation as evidenced by the increase in the adjusted R2
values reported in the bottom panel. In addition, the coecient of the prot rate increases as the
TTB length increases. For example, as we move from J = 2 to J = 3 the prot rate coecient rises
from 0.22 to 0.29. In other words, the regression results indicate a higher sensitivity of investment
to prots as the length of TTB increases. This follows from standard econometric results since
marginal q, prot rate and the omitted state variable are strongly correlated (e.g. Judge et al.
(1985), p.858); accordingly the mean value of the prot rate coecient reported in Table 3 will
vary proportionately with the true coecient of
P4
k=1
P2
i=1 'isit;k
Kt;k
with a factor of proportionality
that is determined by the correlation of the RHS regressors with the omitted state variable and
vary inversely with the true coecient on q which falls with 'J as J increases (Appendix 3 provides
the details). The results of Table 3 clearly illustrate that the omission of the TTB state variable
generates a large bias of the prot rate coecient since the true coecient on this variable is zero.
This bias ranges from 0.22 to 0.35 and leads to incorrect inferences on the role of cash ow in the
investment-q regression framework.
We now turn to the question of whether our model can replicate the dierent cross sectional
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investment-cash ow sensitivity reported in the majority of empirical studies that test the imperfect
capital markets hypothesis.
4.3 Cross sectional implications
In this section we discuss some potential cross sectional implications of TTB. Our model predicts
that the cash ow eect will be present across dierent cross sections of rms as long as all cross
sections share the same TTB technology. This will be true for example for small vs. large rms.
On the other hand, studies that seek to test for capital market imperfections typically report
investment-cash ow sensitivities that vary signicantly by cross section (see Fazzari et al. (1988)
or Gilchrist and Himmelberg (1995)). Evidently our model predicts the same cash ow sensitivity
for either small or large rms if they are subject to the same TTB technology. The length for TTB
however will crucially depend on the type of investment that rms undertake. Consider for example
two rms (A and B) that are identical in all other respects except that rm A invests proportionally
more in structures and less in equipment compared to rm B. The available evidence discussed in
Appendix 2 suggests that TTB is considerably longer for structures than it is for equipment.
Therefore rm A will be characterized by a longer TTB technology compared to rm B. The
results from Table 3 then predict a larger cash ow coecient for rm A compared to rm B. Is
it then likely that dierences in TTB technologies exist among dierent groups of rms in such a
way as to be able to capture the dierences in investment-cash ow sensitivities reported in the
literature? For this purpose we bring to light evidence that strongly suggests TTB varies by rm
size. We have information from a large sample of Compustat and Datastream rms (U.S. and U.K.
manufacturing sectors respectively) that allows us to compute investment spending in structures
and equipment. Table 5 reports the mean ratio of structures to equipment investment for small
and large rms classied as such using the same classication criteria adopted by existing empirical
work. The robust feature of Table 5 is that small rms exhibit higher structures to equipment
spending ratios compared to large rms and in some cases these dierences are also statistical
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signicant at the 5% and 10% signicance level.7 Consequently small rms may be characterized
by longer TTB periods for their capital expenditures. The implication is that small rms should
exhibit higher sensitivity to prots compared to large rms. Even one quarter dierence in the
TTB technology can produce signicant dierences in investment{prot sensitivities between rms
as Table 3 illustrates. The model is thus capable in replicating the cross sectional dierences in
investment cash-ow sensitivities documented in empirical work by exploiting dierences in TTB
technology as suggested by the evidence above.
4.4 Implications for empirical work
In light of our ndings it is worthwhile investigating the empirical implications and oer some
recommendations for empirical work. Specically we would like to know what particular information
from the data can be used in order to estimate a correctly specied investment-q regression under
TTB investment. For the remainder of the analysis we focus on the case J = 3. It is quite
straightforward to generalize for any J . The key state variable that creates the link with cash ow
(or more generally any protability measure) is given by,
4X
k=1
P2
i=1 'isit;k
Kt;k
In Appendix 3 we show that the state variable above can be approximated by the following
expression,
4X
k=1
P2
i=1 'isit;k
Kt;k
u
4X
k=1
 It 1;k
Kt;k
  '1(1  (1  )
gt;k
)

(4.4)
where gt;k =
Kk
Kk 1 denotes the quarterly growth rate of capital in year t. For data observed at
7The pattern of capital expenditure reported in the Annual Capital Expenditure Survey from the US
Census Bureau also shows that in contrast to large rms, small rms (classied by number of employees)
invest more in structures compared to equipment. Over the period reported (1995-2006) small rms have an
average ratio of structures to equipment expenditure equal to 0.60, while large rms have an average ratio
equal to 0.49. The data are for the non farm business sector and cover the period 1995 to 2006. The Annual
Capital Expenditure Survey reports capital expenditure separately by structures and equipment for rms
with and without employees. The data can be found at: http://www.census.gov/csd/ace.
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the annual frequency one can approximate the RHS of the above expression with
Iat 1
Kat
  4'1(1  4(1  )
gat
) (4.5)
where the superscript a denotes annual measures. The expression above involves only observable
variables, namely lagged investment rate adjusted by the growth rate of capital,
Iat 1
Kat
and the growth
rate of capital, gat . It follows from the expression above that one need only use
Iat 1
Kat
and the inverse
growth rate of capital (gat )
 1 as additional RHS regressors in the investment-q regression (the rest
of the terms will be subsumed in the constant) to control for the omitted state variable. Most
importantly the use of the variables above as RHS regressors has a very practical advantage from
an empirical perspective; they do not require knowledge of the TTB length (i.e. the same regressors
control for TTB for any J) or the TTB parameters.
4.4.1 Simulation analysis
Table 6 reports investment-q regression results augmented with the two variables above, i.e. lagged
investment rate, and the inverse growth rate of capital. To judge the adequacy of our proposed
controls for TTB we compare Table 6 with the regression results from Table 3. There are two notable
ndings. First, and most importantly the prot rate coecient in Table 6 falls dramatically for
all J as compared to the corresponding coecients from Table 3 (see bottom panel, Table 6). For
example, for J = 3 the prot rate coecient drops to 0.004 compared to 0.29. The coecient
on the prot rate is still positive|due to the time aggregation error|but the adjusted R2 does
not increase when the prot rate is added to the regression indicating that this variable contains
no explanatory power|as seen by the dierence in the adjusted R2 between the top and bottom
panels of Table 6. Second, the TTB state variable can potentially account for a signicant fraction
of the total variance in the investment rate. This fraction can be calculated by comparing the R2
values between Tables 3 and 10 which suggests that up to an additional 11% (for J = 4) of the
total variance in investment can be explained by this channel. These results clearly suggest that
the inclusion of the two proposed variables can suciently control for TTB investment and are
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therefore useful in empirical work.8
Another serious concern that often arises in empirical work with investment equations is the
use of Tobin's or average q calculated from nancial market data. Typically researchers are either
unable to observe marginal q or the homogeneity assumptions that must be satised for the two
measures to be equivalent are violated (due to for example market power or decreasing returns to
scale). Thus researchers must rely on nancial market information and use average (or Tobin's)
q to control for future investment opportunities in the RHS of the investment regression. The
use of average q has been criticized extensively because of the measurement error it may entail
(see Erickson and Whited (2000) and Cummins et al. (2006) among others) but we think it is
instructive to assess the regression implications when one has only available this imperfect measure.
We introduce measurement error in our marginal q and use this noisy indicator as our q measure,
qat = q
a
t + t; t s N(0; 2)
where  denotes measurement error and we set 2 to 1/10 the variance of marginal q
a implying
a signal to noise ratio of 10. We report the results from regressing the investment rate on this noisy
measure of q and the prot rate in Table 7. The estimated prot rate coecients are noticeably
larger compared to the corresponding coecients from Table 3. For example, for J = 3 the
estimated prot rate coecient equals 0.42 compared to 0.29 in Table 3. These results suggest
that the use of a noisy indicator of marginal q magnies the specication error arising from TTB
investment. Panel II of the same Table reports results when we control for TTB by including the
additional RHS regressors and panel III adds the prot rate to the regression of panel II. The
important nding from comparing panels II and III is that the role of prot rate is un-important
as seen by the nil dierence between the adjusted R2 values at the bottom of Table 7. This
8In additional simulated regressions (not reported for brevity) we further examine the usefulness of these
variables under the three alternative TTB parametrizations we examine in section 4.5. We note that the
ndings are qualitatively similar, namely, the coecient of the prot rate approaches zero and adding the
latter as an additional RHS regressor does not improve the predictive power of the regression.
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demonstrates that the inclusion of the two variables that control for TTB investment is also robust
to measurement error in q.
4.5 Robustness to TTB technology
In this section we consider three alternative calibrations of the TTB process using available evi-
dence from various countries and manufacturing industries. First, there exists evidence indicating
little resources are spent in the initial stages of the project (TTP spending pattern). For example,
TTP eects seem to be an important feature for investment in structures (see Del Boca et al.
(2008) and Koeva (2001), Christiano and Todd (1996) or Edge (2007)). Second, evidence indicat-
ing that spending follows a hump shaped pattern, i.e increasing when approaching the middle of
the construction phase and declining towards the end (hump shaped TTB spending pattern, see
Zhou (2000) and Palm et al. (1993)). Finally, evidence indicating that the majority of resources
are spend in the rst stages with a declining portion allocated in the later stages (declining TTB
spending pattern, see Peeters (1998) and Altug (1989)). We explore these three dierent TTB
spending patterns that imply time-to-plan (TTP) eects, hump shaped spending eects, and de-
clining spending eects. Table 8 conveniently summarizes the TTB parameter values we use in
each case. We re-estimate the investment equation (4.2) on our articial panel using the three
alternative parametrizations. Table 9 reports results under the TTP investment pattern. The re-
gression results are qualitatively very similar to those in Table 3. The most notable nding from
the TTP technology is that the role of the prot rate seems to be more important compared to
the baseline TTB case. From Tables 3 and 9 we see that the estimated prot coecients (b2) are
on average larger under TTP for all J , and that the predictive role of the prot rate (as captured
by dierences in the adjusted R2) is higher. We also note that this result is consistent with the
cross sectional implications we highlighted in the previous section. Given the evidence presented
in section 4.2 we would expect small rms investment technology to have a stronger TTP element
compared to large rms since the former invest dis-proportionately more in structures compared
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to the latter. Under TTP investment we would therefore expect dierences in cash ow eects to
be even more pronounced among rms that dier in size. Tables 10 and 11 report results for the
hump shaped and declining pattern of TTB respectively. Tables 10 and 11, similar to Tables 3 and
7, show positive and statistically signicant prot rate coecients, validating the TTB channel for
the emergence of the cash ow eect in these alternative parametrizations.
4.6 Empirical application
In this section we test the predictions of the theoretical model using rm level data from the
UK manufacturing sector. This dataset consist of UK quoted company balance sheets collected by
Datastream. The main variables we use are ows of investment, sales, prots, cash ow and Tobin's
q. Investment is dened as the purchase of xed assets by the rm. Cash ow is measured as the
sum of the rm's after tax prots and depreciation. Tobin's q is computed as the ratio of the sum of
the market value of the rm and the rm's total debt to the replacement value of its capital stock.
The measure of the replacement value of capital stock is obtained from the book value of the rm's
stock of net xed assets, using the investment data in a standard perpetual inventory formula. The
detailed data Appendix provides precise denitions and sources of all variables used in the empirical
analysis. Table 12 reports summary statistics for the variables used in the empirical application.
The rst column lists the variables used. The second column reports sample means and standard
deviations for all rm-years. The third and fourth columns reports the same information according
to the size (based on the number of employees) classication.
The rm level panel we use comprises of 7091 rm-year observations (760 rms). As in previous
work with the investment-q framework we estimate regressions with Tobin's q augmented by cash
ow to illustrate the eect of the latter and the cross sectional sensitivity between dierent types
of rms emphasized in the literature. We specify and estimate the identical equation we have used
in the previous sections. In order to create sub-samples of rms that are expected to face dierent
degrees of capital market imperfections we use size and dividend payout ratios as splitting criteria.
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These classication criteria have been widely employed in previous work that test the capital
markets imperfection hypothesis with the investment-q framework. For the size classication we
use the number of employees (or alternatively real sales). We then further augment our equations
with the two variables that aim to control for the omitted state variable as explained in section
4.4. The estimation results for the employment classication are presented in Table 13. We report
both OLS (in columns (0) to (3)) and rst dierenced GMM (in columns (4) and (5)) results.9
Columns (1) and (4) clearly demonstrate a cash ow eect present in the investment regression.
The estimated cash ow coecients are positive and signicant in most cases at the 1% level. For
example, the estimated cash ow coecients in columns (1) and (4) range from 0.07 to 0.098 for
small rms and 0.06 to 0.036 for large rms. Moreover, the dierence in the cash ow coecients
between small and large rms based on the GMM estimates is signicant at the 5% level as can
be seen by the test on the equality of coecients. These results are in line with typical ndings
reported in earlier work with UK rm level panel data (see e.g. Carpenter and Guariglia (2008),
and Bond et al. (2003)). Despite the cash ow eect the tests on the GMM equations indicates
some problems with this specication. The m2 test of second order serial correlation of the rst
dierenced residuals is rejected at the 10% level and while the Hansen's J test of overidentifying
restrictions cannot be rejected at the 10% level, this is only marginal (see column (4)).
In columns (2), (3) and (5) we augment the regressions with the two variables that aim to
control for any possible TTB eects. According to the simulated results of section 4.4, if the TTB
channel is important, we would expect to see these variables to be statistically signicant and
improve the t of the regression. First, as we can see from columns (2), (3) and (5) both of these
variables enter the equations signicantly; in all cases they are signicant at the 1% level. In the
GMM equation (column 5) both m2 and Hansen' J test indicate no problems with the specication,
whereas this inclusion improves the t of the equation as seen by the adjusted R2 values in columns
9We present results using both methods, we note however, that the most recent empirical literature
typically reports results from rst-dierenced GMM specications.
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(2) and (3). More importantly, the cash ow eect almost completely disappears as can be seen by
the estimated coecients for both types of rms|small and large. The estimated coecients for
small and large rms decline from 0.098 to 0.014 and from 0.036 to 0.012 respectively (comparing
columns (4) and (5)) and we cannot reject the null of equality between them. Looking across the
OLS estimates we note that the explanatory power of the regression when the two variables are
included as RHS regressors is improving signicantly. For example the adjusted R2 rises from 0.21
(when only Tobin's q is included) to 0.60 when the two additional variables are included (compare
columns (0) and (3)). Further, adding cash ow to this last regression only marginally improves the
t of the equation from 0.60 to 0.61 (compare columns (2) and (3)) and the size of the coecients
are signicantly smaller. Thus the inclusion of the two variables that aim to control for the TTB
eect of investment nearly eliminate the cash ow eect previously estimated. A similar set of
ndings is reported in Tables 14 and 15 when alternative classication schemes are used. Last, we
note that the coecient on q appears to be quite small and implies large adjustment cost estimates.
We remind the readers that the coecient on q would also reect the TTB parameters and hence
the true adjustment cost estimate may be much larger than the one implied here. Although it is
not possible to separately identify the TTB from the adjustment cost parameter in this framework,
a suggestive back of the envelope calculation using the calibrated TTB parameters shows that the
coecients on Tobin's q should be scaled by a factor of between 4 to 10 (corresponding to 'J = 0:25
and 'J = 0:1) implying much lower adjustment cost estimates. However, an additional confounding
factor that makes the interpretation of q problematic is the likely measurement error present in
Tobin's q. Controlling for the latter as in Erickson and Whited (2000) may also resolve part of the
bias present in the Tobin's q coecient.
The results from the empirical analysis are remarkably in line with the predictions of the
theoretical model; the TTB channel emphasized in this study appears to be able to explain away
the cash ow eect, a very robust nding in the empirical investment-q literature. These ndings
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therefore pose a question mark on the validity of the interpretation of the cash ow eect in the
investment-q framework.
5 Conclusions
We revisit the interpretation of an important empirical regularity, namely the nding, established
in a large body of empirical work, that cash ow is important in investment regressions because
it reects capital market imperfections. This paper develops a rich decision theoretic model of
investment with time-to-build and time-to-plan features for the installation of capital and shows
that cash ow may be found to be important even if capital markets are perfect and even when
future investment opportunities are properly accounted for. This new explanation relies on the
idea and supportive empirical evidence that it takes time to build productive capital. With time-
to-build, the simple q framework is inadequate to fully explain optimal investment as it omits a
key state variable from the investment regression. We show how a researcher can, under certain
assumptions on the time-to-build technology, approximate for this omitted state variable and hence
obtain the correct inference from a modied investment-q regression. We evaluate the validity of
the TTB channel in a large panel of UK manufacturing rms and nd that the cash ow eect
largely disappears when we control for TTB investment conrming the predictions of the model.
Our results suggest that investment cash ow sensitivities are not the right framework to evaluate
the capital market imperfections view. Recently, researchers have undertaken carefully designed
tests that are robust to a range of problems associated with this framework. Rauh (2006) for
example designs an experiment that can identify variation in the availability of internal funds that
is by construction orthogonal to future investment opportunities. His results lend support to the
existence of capital market imperfections. Another type of capital that should be less subject to the
critique raised in this paper is inventories. Inventories are most likely not subject to TTB eects
and have low adjustment costs compared to xed investment suggesting they provide a more robust
way to test for the perfect capital markets hypothesis.
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Finally, since our model is designed with perfect capital markets, is not equipped to evaluate
the impact of capital market imperfections in the investment-q regressions we have examined. It
is entirely possible that at least some of the cash ow eects found in previous empirical work are
due to agency costs in capital markets that drive a wedge between the cost of internal and external
nance. We can only conjecture that if capital market imperfections coexist with TTB eects will
render cash ow sensitivities dicult to interpret as indicators for the severity of nancing con-
straints. An interesting possibility is to examine how the presence of capital market imperfections
can interact and inuence the length of TTB. One may reasonably conjecture that small rms
may be characterized by lengthier TTB technology because they are constrained in the funds they
can extract from the market in order to proceed with the construction (or delivery) stages of their
projects. This is an interesting avenue left for future research.
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A Appendix 1
This section derives the equilibrium conditions of the model. A rm i in this industry solves
(dropping the subscript):
max
Lt;sJt;dt
E0
1X
t=0
tdivt (A.1)
s:t.
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given the initial values, K0;M0; sj0; j = 1; :::; J   1; f"At g0t= J+1; f"!t g0t= J+1.
Introducing the Kuhn-Tucker multipliers qt and t we can write the Langrangean for this
problem,
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The rst order conditions associated with this problem are:
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Collecting all the equations above that characterize equilibrium yields:
EtF (yt+J ; :::; yt+1; yt; xt+J ; :::; xt+1; xt) = 0 (A.2)
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where Et denotes the mathematical expectations operator conditional on information at time t, xt
denotes the vector of state variables and consists of capital, Kt, materials, Mt partially complete
projects, fsjtgJ 1j=1 , and the two exogenous precesses for productivity, At, and !t. The vector yt
denotes the vector of choice variables and consists of labor, Lt, materials orders, dt, and new
projects, sJt. The solution to the model given in equation A:2 can be expressed as
yt = g(xt; )
xt+1 = h(xt; ) + "t+1
where g is a function that maps the vector of states, xt to choice variables, yt, h is a function that
maps the state vector at time t to time t+ 1,  is a vector selecting the exogenous state variables,
in this case At and !t, and  = [A !]. We want to nd a second order approximation of the
functions, g; h around the non-stochastic steady state, (xt; ) = (x; 0). The non-stochastic steady
state is dened as vectors (x; y) such that F (y; :::; y; y; x; :::; x; x) = 0.
To compute the second order approximation around (x; ) = (x; 0), one substitutes the proposed
policy rules into (A.2) and makes use of the fact that derivatives of any order of (A.2) must equal
zero in order to compute the coecients of the Taylor approximations of the proposed policy
functions. The second order solution for all variables of the model is completely characterized by
the matrices that collect the rst and second order derivatives of the policy (g) and transition
(h) functions with respect to the state variables and , gx; hx; gxx; hxx; g; h. For example, the
second order approximation for g and h can be written respectively as (see Schmitt-Grohe and
Uribe (2004)),
[g(x; )]i = [g(x; 0)]i + [gx(x; 0)]
i
a(x  x)a +
1
2
[gxx(x; 0)]
i
ab(x  x)a(x  x)b +
1
2
[g(x; 0)]
i[][]
[h(x; )]j = [h(x; 0)]j + [hx(x; 0)]
j
a(x  x)a +
1
2
[hxx(x; 0)]
j
ab(x  x)a(x  x)b +
1
2
[g(x; 0)]
j [][]
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where i = L; sJ ; d, a; b = K;M; fsjgJ 1j=1 ; A; !, j = K;M; fsjgJ 1j=1 ; A; !. [gx]ia; [hx]ia denote the
(i; a) element of the rst order derivative of g, h with respect to x and similarly for the second
order derivatives. Notice that all the matrices collecting rst and second order derivatives above are
evaluated at the non-stochastic steady state, i.e. (x; 0). In turn the non-stochastic steady state can
be easily computed by solving the f.o.c's setting At = At+1 = E(A) and similarly !t = !t+1 = E(!)
and solving the resulting static system of equations for x; y.
B Appendix 2
Description of the calibration. The values for the output elasticity of materials, , labor,
 and capital,  are taken from the manufacturing plant level study of Sakellaris and Wilson
(2004) (Table 1, p.15, C). These values imply an overall returns to scale equal to 0.98. This value
is consistent with Basu and Fernald (1997) estimates of the returns to scale in manufacturing.
There is a variety of empirical evidence of time-to-build for capital projects. Regarding equipment
investment, Abel and Blanchard (1986) document an average delivery lag for manufacturing rms
equal to three quarters (during which time they pay installments for the purchase of the capital
good). Mayer and Sonenblum (1955) report that the average time across industries needed to
equip plants with new machinery is 2.7 quarters. Montgomery (1995) examines a long series of
nely detailed surveys conducted by the U.S. Department of Commerce on TTB patterns for a
wide range of rm construction projects. His calculations imply a time-to-build between ve to
six quarter for non-residential structures. There is still evidence of lengthier construction times for
non-residential structures. According to Mayer (1960) and Koeva (2001) it takes approximately two
years to complete non-residential structures. A recent study by Del Boca et al. (2008) using Italian
rm level data suggests that investment projects require 2-3 years from initial stage to completion,
while equipment investment becomes productive within a year. Based on this evidence and given
the fact that the model's empirical counterpart is total capital we think that three or four quarters
is a reasonable length for the time-to-build assumption. We set the length of the time-to-build
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equal to three quarters (J=3) in our baseline calibration but we also discuss results varying this
value up to four quarters. In terms of the resources spent on each stage of the construction (or
installments for delivery) Kydland and Prescott (1982) assume an equal cost distribution. Recently,
Zhou (2000) argues that time-to-build is very important for explaining investment dynamics. He
estimates 'i for various values of J and reports that an (approximately) equal distribution of
cost for time-to-build investment produces the best t for aggregate U.S. investment. There also
exist estimates (e.g. Del Boca et al. (2008)) particularly for investment in structures that point
to initial planning phases with little or no resources spent followed by construction phases with
increasing resources as projects near completion. This pattern of spending is known as time-to-plan
(TTP). For the baseline calibration we set '1 = '3 = 0:333; '2 = 0:34 and explore TTP in the
simulations as an alternative scenario. The parameter that governs the convexity of the adjustment
cost function,  is set equal to 1:08 at the quarterly rate. This parameter is estimated by Barnett
and Sakellaris (1999) using a Tobin's q approach in a panel of manufacturing rms from 1959 to
1987 (see Table 3 p.256). In implementing their approach the authors assume a time-to-build of one
year thus closely corresponding to our assumptions. The magnitude of (convex) adjustment costs
estimated by Barnett and Sakellaris (1999) and more recently by Cooper and Haltiwanger (2006)
seem to be conforming much better to the q theory of investment compared to earlier estimates
that produced implausibly large adjustment cost estimates (See for example, Hayashi (1982), or
Summers (1981)).We choose to work with these recent (more realistic) estimates for another reason.
A higher adjustment cost parameter  would imply a greater positive serial correlation of investment
that would (in the presence of autocorrelated productivity) be more strongly correlated with prots,
thus making it easier to obtain a signicant prot rate coecient in a mis-specied regression. We
also experiment with several alternative values for  taken from these studies. The subjective
discount factor, , is chosen to match the average risk-free real interest rate over the period 1947
I to 2006 II. The real interest rate is dened as the 3-month U.S. T-bill rate less consumer price
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ination. The depreciation rate for materials is calculated as follows. The stock of materials at the
end of a quarter is (1 m)Mt. Usage of materials in quarter t is mMt. Since usage is not available
quarterly but only annually we use the following approximation. usageyq =
usagey
outputy output
y
q , where y
denotes year and q quarters. This calculation should be suciently accurate since materials usage
and output are highly correlated and their ratio will thus be quite smooth in the short-run. The
data used for this calculation are available from the Annual Survey of Manufacturers (ASM) and the
NBER manufacturing productivity database. m is then calculated from the restriction
(1 m)Mt
mMt
=
materials inventories at end quarter t
usage of materials in quarter t
. In the data (1962-2000) the ratio is on average equal to
0.33. The calculation implies m = 0:75. We set  the xed capital depreciation rate to 0:025 per
quarter. We calibrate the process for the idiosyncratic productivity shock, !; ! to match the
autocorrelation and standard deviation of (cyclical) aggregate manufacturing investment. Finally,
we calibrate the process for the aggregate productivity shock, A; A to match the autocorrelation
and standard deviation of (cyclical) aggregate manufacturing output. The data for this calculation
(manufacturing investment and output) are taken from the Bureau of Economic Analysis and cover
the period 1967 II to 2004 IV.
C Appendix 3
Time Aggregation. To obtain annual from quarterly measures we adopt the same methodology
as in the national accounts and employed by Hall (2004). Specically, we set all the ow variables
at the annual rate equal to the sum of the corresponding ow variables over the quarters, i.e., for
ow variable x, xat =
P4
k=1 xt;k, where x = I; ; si; ; i = 1; :::J and a denotes annual frequency.
The annual measure for marginal q, is the average over the corresponding quarterly measure.
However, it diers slightly depending on the TTB. We use the following denitions,
J = 1 ; qat =
P4
k=1 qt;k
4
J = 2 ; qat =
P4
k=1Ekqt;k+1
4
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J = 3 ; qat =
P4
k=1Ekqt;k+2
4
J = 4 ; qat =
P4
k=1Ekqt;k+3
4
In general
P4
k=1 Ekqt;k+J 1
4 6=
P4
k=1 qt;k
4 . However, with autocorrelated productivity shocks the
two measures are highly correlated. We use the marginal expected q for each dierent J to isolate
the omitted variable eect. Our results are broadly similar if we use the same q for each J .
Finally, we take the annual capital stock to correspond to the end of year (i.e. fourth quarter)
stock. Alternatively, the annual measure for the capital stock can be calculated from Kat+1 =
(1  a)Kat + sa1t. The results are insensitive to this alternative denition.
Expression for the time aggregation error. To derive this expression we assume no TTB
(i.e. J = 1). We begin with equation,
 4  
 4X
k=1
(
It;k
Kt;k
  )

+
4X
k=1
qt;k = 0
where t denotes years.
If we add and subtract 
P4
k=1(
It;k
Kat
  )

we get
 4  
 4X
k=1
(
It;k
Kat
  )

+ 

1
Kat
4X
k=1
It;k
Kt;k
Kt;k  
4X
k=1
It;k
Kt;k

+
4X
k=1
qt;k = 0
The term,

1
Kat
P4
k=1
It;k
Kt;k
Kt;k  
P4
k=1
It;k
Kt;k

which will be 6= 0 in general, represents the time
aggregation error. It is easy to see that this term will be zero only when investment is equal to
replacement investment (K), so that capital in year t, Kat = Kt;k. Similar expressions for the time
aggregation error characterize J = 2; 3; 4:
Re-writing this equation (dividing by four and using
P4
k=1
It;k
Kat
=
Iat
Kat
, qat =
P4
k=1 qt;k
4 ,
1

4
= 1a )
after suppressing all the constant terms yields the nal equation,
Iat
Kat
= constant+

1
Kat
4X
k=1
It;k
Kt;k
Kt;k  
4X
k=1
It;k
Kt;k

+
1
a
qat
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Empirical proxy. Next, we show the derivation of the empirical proxy in equation 4.5.
4X
k=1
P2
i=1 'isit;k
Kt;k
=
4X
k=1
 It 1;k
Kt;k
  '1(1  (1  )
gt;k
) + '1(
'2
'1
  1)s1t;k
Kt;k
+ '2(
'3
'2
  1)s2t;k
Kt;k

The RHS of the equation above yields,
Iat 1
Kat
+
4X
k=1
 It 1;k
Kt;k
  It 1;k
Kat
  '1 4X
k=1
 
1  (1  )
gt;k
)

+
 
'1(
'2
'1
  1)s1t;k
Kt;k
+ '2(
'3
'2
  1)s2t;k
Kt;k

Equation 4.7 in the text follows from the above when we impose the symmetry assumption of
TTB (i.e. '1 = '2 = '3) and use gt;k u 14g
a
t .
Coecient bias. We derive the expressions that determine the biases in the coecients of q
and the prot rate in the investment regression.
Consider the regression
y = X11 +X22 +X33 + u
where y =
Iat
Kat
; X1 = q
a
t ; X2 =
at
Kat
; X3 =
P4
k=1
P2
i=1 'isit;k
Kt;k
. The true coecient of
at
Kat
will be 2 = 0.
Now suppose we specify the following regression equation (i.e. equation 4.4)
y = X11 +X22 + e
where the error e term is now given by
e = X33 + u
The OLS coecient vector is given by,
"
b1
b2
#
=
"
X 01X1 X 01X2
X 02X1 X 02X2
#"
X 01y
X 02y
#
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Using standard matrix formulas this equation can be written as,
"
b1
b2
#
=
"
D 11 D
 1
2
D 13 D
 1
4
#"
X 01y
X 02y
#
where D 11 = (X
0
1X1  X 01X2(X 02X2) 1X 02X1) 1,
D 12 =  (X 01X1  X 01X2(X 02X2) 1X 02X1) 1(X 01X2)(X 02X2) 1,
D 13 =  (X 02X2) 1(X 02X1)(X 01X1  X 01X2(X 02X2) 1X 02X1) 1,
D 14 = (X
0
2X2)
 1 + (X 02X2) 1(X 02X1)(X 01X1  X 01X2(X 02X2) 1X 02X1) 1(X 01X2)(X 02X2) 1
The expected value of the OLS coecients on the prot rate and marginal q will be given by,
E(b2) = [D
 1
3 (X
0
1X1) +D
 1
4 (X
0
2X1)]1 + [D
 1
3 (X
0
1X3) +D
 1
4 (X
0
2X3)]3
E(b1) = [D
 1
1 (X
0
1X1) +D
 1
2 (X
0
2X1)]1 + [D
 1
1 (X
0
1X3) +D
 1
2 (X
0
2X3)]3
One can show thatD 11 > 0; D
 1
2 < 0; D
 1
3 < 0; D
 1
4 > 0 as long as (X
0
1X1 X 01X2(X 02X2) 1X 02X1) 1 >
0. SinceX1 = q
a
t ; X2 =
at
Kat
this condition simplies to (var(qat ) cov(qat ; 
a
t
Kat
)var(
at
Kat
) 1cov(qat ;
at
Kat
)) >
0. This can further be written as 1 > 2x1;x2 which will be always satised unless 
2
x1;x2 = 1. It is
easy to see from the expressions above that when this condition is satised, E(b2) will fall with 1,
while E(b1) will rise with 1 and rise with 3. Therefore as long as 'J is falling with J this will
always be the case.
D Data Appendix
We started with 11,536 rm-year observations (1113 rms) over the period 1980-2000. We excluded
rms that changed the date of their accounting year-end by more than a few weeks, so that the
data refers to 12 month accounting periods. To control for the potential inuence of outliers we
removed observations beyond the 1st and 99th percentiles for each of the regression variables; we
also excluded observations characterized by an investment to capital ratio greater than one. This
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trimming is aimed at eliminating observations reecting particularly large mergers or coding errors.
Note that these types of sample selection are common in the literature and we employ them for
compatibility with previous work. We have also dropped rm-year observations that did not have
complete records on the variables used in our regressions. Moreover, because we use Generalized
Method of Moments (GMM) to estimate the investment equations in rst dierences with values
of the regressors lagged twice or more as instruments we require at least three cross sectional
observations to allow for the rst dierencing process and the construction of the instruments.
This meant that only rms with a minimum of three consecutive observations were kept in the
sample. After all these adjustments we were left with a panel of 7091 rm-year observations (760
rms). The following describes the construction of variables (with Datastream codes in parenthesis
where applicable).
Investment(I). Up to 1991: xed assets purchased by the company excluding assets acquired
from new subsidiaries (v341). After 1991: cash paid by the company towards the purchase of xed
assets (v1024: property, plant or equipment).
Depreciation(). We use rates of 8.19% for plant and machinery and 2.5% for land and buildings
(from King and Fullerton (1984)). For each observation we then calculate the proportion of land and
building investment and calculate the depreciation rate as follows:  = 0:0819(1 mb)+0:025mb,
where mb is the average value of the proportion of buildings investment as described above.
Replacement value of the capital stock(K). We use net tangible xed assets as the historic value
of the capital stock (as computed above). We assume that replacement cost and historic cost are
the same in the rst year of data for each rm. We then apply the perpetual inventory formula
(Bond and Meghir (1994)) as follows: Kt = Kt 1  (1   )  PtPt 1 + It. In the formula Pt denotes
the price of investment goods computed from the implicit deator for gross xed capital formation
available from the National Statistics Oce.
Cash ow(CF). Sum of after tax prots (v623) and depreciation (v136).
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Tobin's q (q). Ratio of value of rm to replacement value of capital. Value of rm is the sum
of enterprise value of rm (v1504), borrowings repayable within one year (v309), total loan capital
repayable after one year (v321).
Total number of employees. Average number of employees as disclosed by the company (v219).
Sales. Amount of goods and services to third parties relating to the normal industrial activities
of the company (v104). Real sales are obtained by dividing with the GDP deator.
Dividend payout ratio. Ratio of dividends (v187) to operating prots (v137).
The two variables that proxy for the omitted state variable due to TTB investment as con-
structed as follows.
It 1
Kt
: using the denitions of investment and capital provided above.
Inverse of the gross growth rate of capital. (gk) 1 = kt 1kt , where k is capital as computed above
(K) deated by the GDP deator.
E Appendix on inference and biases under TTB in-
vestment
In this section we report the inference problem in the investment-q framework under TTB invest-
ment. As explained in section 4.1.1 an investment-q regression that fails to account for TTB would
lead one (a) to overestimate the adjustment cost parameter implied by the coecient of q due to
the scaling by the TTB parameter and (b) introduce a positive bias in the prot rate coecient, as
the true value of the latter in this model is equal to zero. In addition to this information we also
report the true bias of the coecient on q assuming that a researcher knows the true value of 'J
and adjusts the coecient estimate of b1 accordingly. Table 16 summarizes this information. Note
that under all TTB parametrizations the inferred adjustment cost estimate, ba is always higher
than the true value and rises with J . By contrast in the hypothetical case a researcher knows the
TTB parameters the coecient on q is biased upward (equivalently the adjustment cost estimate
is biased downwards) and the true bias is negative. This is due to the fact that the mean value of
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the coecient on q rises with the true parameter of the omitted state variable. Finally, the bias of
the prot rate coecient is always positive and rises with J .
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Table 1: Calibrated parameters
Description Value Source
 elasticity materials 0.53 Sakellaris and Wilson (2004) (Table 1, p.15, C)
 elasticity labor 0.32 Sakellaris and Wilson (2004) (Table 1, p.15, C)
 elasticity capital 0.13 Sakellaris and Wilson (2004) (Table 1, p.15, C)
'1 fraction in nal stage 0.33 various (see Appendix)
'2 fraction in middle stage 0.34 various (see Appendix)
'3 fraction in initial stage 0.33 various (see Appendix)
 depreciation capital 0.025 standard value from literature
m depreciation materials 0.75 NBER man. productivity data
 = 1
1+r
discount factor 0.99 average risk free rate
a adjustment cost 0.27 Barnett and Sakellaris (1999) estimates
A std. deviation common 0.045 BEA manufacturing output
A AR(1) common 0.90 BEA manufacturing output
! std. deviation idiosyncratic 0.025 BEA manufacturing investment
! AR(1) idiosyncratic 0.90 BEA manufacturing investment
Notes. See Appendix 2 for a detailed description of the calibration sources.
Table 2: Investment regressions{empirical specication
Coecient J = 1 J = 2 J = 3 J = 4
b1 0.91 0.55 0.41 0.33
(0.0001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
b2 0.0001 0.49 0.54 0.58
(0.0001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003)
R
2
0.99 0.97 0.92 0.87
Notes. The Table reports coecients of the regression,
Ij;t
Kj;t
=  + b1Et(qj;t+2) + b2
j;t
Kj;t
+ "j;t based on the quarterly model.
In this Table J denotes TTB in quarters. Standard errors are in parenthesis. All statistics are averages over 500 replications.
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Table 3: Investment regressions{empirical specication with annual measures
True a = 0.27
Coecient J = 1 J = 2 J = 3 J = 4
b1 3.50 3.37 3.20 3.00
(0.0001) (0.004) (0.008) (0.01)ba = 1
b1
0.28 0.29 0.31 0.33
R
2
0.99 0.98 0.94 0.88
b1 3.46 2.97 2.55 2.20
(0.001) (0.006) (0.01) (0.02)
b2 0.03 0.22 0.29 0.35
(0.0007) (0.003) (0.004) (0.006)
R
2
0.99 0.99 0.95 0.91
Notes. The top panel reports the coecients of the regression,
Iat
Kat
=  + b1q
a
t + "
a
t . The bottom panel reports coecients of
the regression,
Iat
Kat
=  + b1q
a
t + b2
at
Kat
+ "at . In this Table J denotes TTB in quarters. Standard errors are in parenthesis. All
statistics are averages over 500 replications.
Table 4: Correlations (baseline calibration)
J = 4 J = 3 J = 2
State variable
P4
k=1
P3
i=1 'isit;k
Kt;k
P4
k=1
P2
i=1 'isit;k
Kt;k
P4
k=1
P1
i=1 'isit;k
Kt;k
at
Kat
0.73 0.85 0.84
J = 3
Iat
Kat
P4
k=1
P2
i=1 'isit;k
Kt;k
at
Kat
qat
Iat
Kat
1 0.99 0.86 0.97P4
k=1
P2
i=1 sit;k
Kt;k
1 0.85 0.93
at
Kat
1 0.83
qat 1
Notes. This Table reports correlations between the prot rate and the state variable that arises under the TTB assumption.
In this Table J denotes TTB in quarters. All statistics are averages over 500 replications.
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Table 5: Firm level data{Evidence for TTB
Size Test
Firm-year Mean values Small Large ( Istr
Ieqp
)small > (
Istr
Ieqp
)large
observations
I. Compustat (1980-2007)
4818 Istr
Ieqp
0.36[ 0.29 p  value=0.042
7628 Istr
Ieqp
0.37y 0.32 p  value=0.095
II. Datastream (1980-2000)
3885 Istr
Ieqp
0.51[ 0.24 p  value=0.19
3856 Istr
Ieqp
0.48y 0.18 p  value=0.18
Notes. Upper panel: Compustat sample of manufacturing rms. Lower panel: Datastream sample of manufacturing rms.
Small rms are classied as belonging to the lower 25 percentile using either real sales ([) or real total assets (y). Large
rms are those belonging to the upper 25 percentile of the corresponding distribution. We use the method proposed by Bond
and Meghir (1994) to estimate gross investment in structures (Istr) and equipment (Ieqp). Specically we use the following
calculation: Iit = ITt
Kit
KTt
, where i=structures, equipment. ITt denotes total gross investment (Compustat data item 30,
Datastream item v431 and v1024), Kit capital stock (book value) in i=structures, equipment (Compustat data item 155 and
156, Datastream item v327 and v328) and KTt total (book value) capital stock (Compustat data item 8, Datastream item
v330).
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Table 6: Investment regressions{empirical specication with annual measures: controlling
for TTB (baseline TTB)
Coecient J = 2 J = 3 J = 4
b1 2.23 1.79 1.31
(0.001) (0.003) (0.005)
b3 0.24 0.38 0.69
(0.002) (0.003) (0.005)
b4 -0.11 -0.11 0.03
(0.004) (0.003) (0.004)
R
2
0.99 0.99 0.99
b1 2.21 1.78 1.23
(0.001) (0.001) (0.01)
b2 -0.02 0.004 0.04
(0.004) (0.004) (0.006)
b3 0.24 0.37 0.69
(0.001) (0.003) (0.005)
b4 -0.14 -0.12 0.05
(0.002) (0.003) (0.004)
R
2
0.99 0.99 0.99
R
2
between top and bottom panels 0.00 0.00 0.00
Notes. Baseline TTB as calibrated in Table 8. The top panel reports the coecients of the regression,
Iat
Kat
= +b1q
a
t +b3
Iat 1
Kat
+
b4(g
a
t )
 1 + "at . The bottom panel reports coecients of the regression,
Iat
Kat
=  + b1q
a
t + b2
at
Kat
+ b3
Iat 1
Kat
+ b4(g
a
t )
 1 + "at . In
this Table J denotes TTB in quarters. Standard errors are in parenthesis. All statistics are averages over 500 replications.
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Table 7: Investment regressions{empirical specication with annual measures and mea-
surement error in q: TTB baseline pattern
Coecient J = 2 J = 3 J = 4
I.
b1 2.62 2.23 1.58
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
b2 0.40 0.42 0.44
(0.008) (0.005) (0.006)
R
2
0.96 0.93 0.89
II.
b1 1.05 1.22 0.92
(0.008) (0.008) (0.007)
b3 0.13 0.62 0.92
(0.004) (0.01) (0.01)
b4 -0.53 -0.03 0.15
(0.004) (0.01) (0.01)
R
2
0.98 0.98 0.98
III.
b1 0.99 1.06 0.59
(0.005) (0.005) (0.02)
b2 -0.13 0.17 0.14
(0.008) (0.009) (0.007)
b3 0.10 0.64 1.06
(0.003) (0.01) (0.007)
b4 -0.64 0.06 0.33
(0.005) (0.01) (0.005)
R
2
0.98 0.98 0.98
R
2
between panels II and III 0.00 0.00 0.00
Notes. Baseline TTB pattern as calibrated in Table 8. Panel I reports coecients of the regression,
Iat
Kat
= +b1q
a
t +b2
at
Kat
+"at .
Panel II reports coecients of the regression,
Iat
Kat
=  + b1q
a
t + b3
Iat 1
Kat
+ b4(g
a
t )
 1 + "at . Panel III reports coecients of the
regression,
Iat
Kat
=  + b1q
a
t + b2
at
Kat
+ b3
Iat 1
Kat
+ b4(g
a
t )
 1 + "at . In this Table J denotes TTB in quarters. Standard errors are in
parenthesis. All statistics are averages over 500 replications.
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Table 8: TTB parametrizations
Baseline TTB pattern
J = 2 '2 = 0:5 '1 = 0:5
J = 3 '3 = 0:33 '2 = 0:34 '1 = 0:33
J = 4 '4 = 0:25 '3 = 0:25 '2 = 0:25 '1 = 0:25
TTP pattern
J = 2 '2 = 0:1 '1 = 0:9
J = 3 '3 = 0:1 '2 = 0:45 '1 = 0:45
J = 4 '4 = 0:1 '3 = 0:30 '2 = 0:30 '1 = 0:30
Hump shaped TTB pattern
J = 3 '3 = 0:1 '2 = 0:8 '1 = 0:1
J = 4 '4 = 0:1 '3 = 0:4 '2 = 0:4 '1 = 0:1
Declining TTB pattern
J = 2 '2 = 0:8 '1 = 0:2
J = 3 '3 = 0:5 '2 = 0:4 '1 = 0:1
J = 4 '4 = 0:4 '3 = 0:3 '2 = 0:2 '1 = 0:1
Notes. Values for ' are not applicable for J=2 under the hump shaped TTB spending pattern. In this case we can only consider
equal, declining and TTP investment spending patterns.
Table 9: Investment regressions{empirical specication with annual measures: TTP pattern
True a = 0.27
Coecient J = 2 J = 3 J = 4
b1 3.34 3.19 2.92
(0.009) (0.01) (0.01)ba = 1
b1
0.30 0.31 0.34
R
2
0.93 0.86 0.75
b1 2.70 2.35 1.75
(0.01) (0.01) (0.002)
b2 0.44 0.45 0.50
(0.006) (0.007) (0.01)
R
2
0.95 0.89 0.80
Notes. The top panel reports the coecients of the regression,
Iat
Kat
=  + b1q
a
t + "
a
t . The bottom panel reports coecients of
the regression,
Iat
Kat
=  + b1q
a
t + b2
at
Kat
+ "at . In this Table J denotes TTB in quarters. Standard errors are in parenthesis. All
statistics are averages over 500 replications.
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Table 10: Investment regressions{empirical specication with annual measures: Hump
shaped TTB pattern
True a = 0.27
Coecient J = 2 J = 3 J = 4
b1 n.a. 3.23 3.01
(0.01) (0.01)ba = 1
b1
n.a. 0.31 0.33
R
2
n.a. 0.92 0.87
b1 n.a. 2.27 1.99
(0.01) (0.01)
b2 n.a. 0.42 0.67
(0.006) (0.02)
R
2
n.a. 0.95 0.90
Notes. The top panel reports the coecients of the regression,
Iat
Kat
=  + b1q
a
t + "
a
t . The bottom panel reports coecients of
the regression,
Iat
Kat
=  + b1q
a
t + b2
at
Kat
+ "at . In this Table J denotes TTB in quarters. Standard errors are in parenthesis. All
statistics are averages over 500 replications. See also notes to Table 8.
Table 11: Investment regressions{empirical specication with annual measures: Declining
TTB pattern
True a = 0.27
Coecient J = 2 J = 3 J = 4
b1 3.44 3.30 3.15
(0.001) (0.005) (0.007)ba = 1
b1
0.29 0.30 0.32
R
2
0.99 0.96 0.95
b1 3.26 2.74 2.54
(0.002) (0.01) (0.01)
b2 0.10 0.25 0.40
(0.001) (0.004) (0.007)
R
2
0.99 0.98 0.97
Notes. The top panel reports the coecients of the regression,
Iat
Kat
=  + b1q
a
t + "
a
t . The bottom panel reports coecients of
the regression,
Iat
Kat
=  + b1q
a
t + b2
at
Kat
+ "at . In this Table J denotes TTB in quarters. Standard errors are in parenthesis. All
statistics are averages over 500 replications.
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Table 12: Summary statistics
All rm - Firm-years with Firm-years with
years SMALLit = 1 SMALLit = 0
Iit
Kit
0.148 0.146 0.151
(0.104) (0.129) (0.098)
qit 3.57 4.27 3.39
(4.78) (6.28) (4.20)
CFit
Kit
0.269 0.252 0.273
(0.35) (0.46) (0.30)
Iit 1
Kit
0.130 0.122 0.131
(0.08) (0.09) (0.07)
(gkit)
 1 1.47 1.97 1.20
(4.20) (5.88) (3.06)
Number of 5086.25 224.01 6778.4
employees (14789.29) (144.33) (16844.65)
Real sales 4141.73 180.78 5566.98
(14199.91) (176.14) (16323.29)
Dividend 0.216 0.209 0.217
payout ratio (2.25) (0.99) (2.42)
Number of 7091 1950 5141
observations
Number of rms 760
Notes. The Table reports sample means. Standard deviations in parenthesis. The subscript i indexes rms and t indexes time,
where t = 1980  2000. SMALLit is a dummy variable equal to 1 if rm i belongs to the lower 25th percentile of rms in the
sample in terms of number of employees and equal to 0 otherwise.
47
Table 13: The eects of cash ow on investment: controlling for TTB
Dependent OLS OLS OLS OLS First-di. First-di.
variable: GMM GMM
Iit
Kit
(0) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
qit 0.006*** 0.005*** 0.002*** 0.003*** 0.004*** 0.002***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
CFit
Kit
 SMALLit 0.07*** 0.023*** n.a. 0.098*** 0.014
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02)
CFit
Kit
 (1  SMALLit) 0.06*** 0.025*** n.a. 0.036 0.012
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02)
Iit 1
Kit
n.a. 0.29*** 0.30*** n.a. 0.19***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.06)
(gkit)
 1 n.a. -0.41*** -0.41*** n.a. -0.55***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.05)
Test on equality of
CFit
Kit
coe. across small and
large rm-years (p-value) 0.14 0.70 0.03 0.91
m2 (p-value shown) 0.06 0.41
Hansen's J (p-value shown) 0.116 0.652
adjusted R2 0.21 0.27 0.61 0.60
Notes. SMALLit is a dummy variable equal to 1 if rm i has employees in the lower 25th percentile (equal to 225 employees)
of all rms in the sample and 0 otherwise. A constant, time and industry dummies are included in all specications although
not reported for brevity. Standard errors and test statistics are asymptotically robust to heteroskedasticity. In columns (4)
and (5) all right hand side regressors are lagged twice and used as instruments. m2 is a test for second order serial correlation
in the rst dierenced residuals, asymptotically distributed as N(0,1) under the null of no serial correlation introduced by
Blundell et al. (1992). The J statistic is a test of the overidentifying restrictions, distributed as 2 under the null of instrument
validity. ***Indicates signicance at the 1% level.
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Table 14: The eects of cash ow on investment: controlling for TTB (alternative classi-
cations (dividend payout))
Dependent OLS OLS OLS OLS First-di. First-di.
variable: GMM GMM
Iit
Kit
(0) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
qit 0.006*** 0.004*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.003*** 0.002***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
CFit
Kit
 SMALLit 0.07*** 0.029*** n.a. 0.058*** 0.003
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01)
CFit
Kit
 (1  SMALLit) 0.06*** 0.024*** n.a. 0.036 0.021
(0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.02)
Iit 1
Kit
n.a. 0.30*** 0.31*** n.a. 0.17***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.05)
(gkit)
 1 n.a. -0.40*** -0.41*** n.a. -0.52***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.05)
Test on equality of
CFit
Kit
coe. across small and
large rm-years (p-value) 0.32 0.31 0.46 0.28
m2 (p-value shown) 0.02 0.56
Hansen's J (p-value shown) 0.55 0.91
adjusted R2 0.21 0.27 0.62 0.60
Notes. SMALLit is a dummy variable equal to 1 if rm i has a dividend payout ratio below the median (equal to 0.22) of all
rms in the sample and 0 otherwise. A constant, time and industry dummies are included in all specications although not
reported for brevity. Standard errors and test statistics are asymptotically robust to heteroskedasticity. In columns (4) and (5)
all right hand side regressors are lagged twice and used as instruments. m2 is a test for second order serial correlation in the
rst dierenced residuals, asymptotically distributed as N(0,1) under the null of no serial correlation introduced by Blundell
et al. (1992). The J statistic is a test of the overidentifying restrictions, distributed as 2 under the null of instrument validity.
***Indicates signicance at the 1% level.
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Table 15: The eects of cash ow on investment: controlling for TTB (alternative classi-
cations (real sales))
Dependent OLS OLS OLS OLS First-di. First-di.
variable: GMM GMM
Iit
Kit
(0) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
qit 0.006*** 0.004*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.004*** 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
CFit
Kit
 SMALLit 0.07*** 0.024*** n.a. 0.092*** 0.025
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01)
CFit
Kit
 (1  SMALLit) 0.07*** 0.030*** n.a. 0.038 0.011
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01)
Iit 1
Kit
n.a. 0.30*** 0.31*** n.a. 0.17***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.05)
(gkit)
 1 n.a. -0.40*** -0.41*** n.a. -0.51***
(0.01) (0.02) (0.04)
Test on equality of
CFit
Kit
coe. across small and
large rm-years (p-value) 0.74 0.27 0.02 0.38
m2 (p-value shown) 0.06 0.55
Hansen's J (p-value shown) 0.54 0.40
adjusted R2 0.21 0.27 0.62 0.60
Notes. SMALLit is a dummy variable equal to 1 if rm i has real sales below the 25th percentile (equal to 216.03) of all
rms in the sample and 0 otherwise. A constant, time and industry dummies are included in all specications although not
reported for brevity. Standard errors and test statistics are asymptotically robust to heteroskedasticity. In columns (4) and (5)
all right hand side regressors are lagged twice and used as instruments. m2 is a test for second order serial correlation in the
rst dierenced residuals, asymptotically distributed as N(0,1) under the null of no serial correlation introduced by Blundell
et al. (1992). The J statistic is a test of the overidentifying restrictions, distributed as 2 under the null of instrument validity.
***Indicates signicance at the 1% level.
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Table 16: Investment regressions{inference and bias
True a = 0.27 True b2 = 0
Coecient J = 2 J = 3 J = 4
I. Baseline TTB
b1 2.97 2.55 2.20
Inferred ca = 1b1 0.34 0.39 0.45
estimated b1 scaled by 'J 5.94 7.65 8.80
i.e. b1
1
'J
Inferred ca = 'Jb1 0.17 0.13 0.11
true bias assuming 'J is known -0.10 -0.14 -0.16
b2 0.22 0.29 0.35
bias in b2 0.22 0.29 0.35
II. TTP
b1 2.70 2.35 1.75
Inferred ca = 1b1 0.37 0.42 0.57
b1 scaled by 'J 27 23.5 17.5
i.e. b1
1
'J
Inferred ca = 'Jb1 0.037 0.042 0.057
true bias assuming 'J is known -0.233 -0.228 -0.213
b2 0.44 0.45 0.50
bias in b2 0.44 0.45 0.50
III. Hump shaped TTB
estimated b1 n.a. 2.27 1.99
Inferred ca = 1b1 n.a. 0.44 0.50
estimated b1 scaled by 'J n.a. 22.7 19.9
i.e. b1
1
'J
Inferred ca = 'Jb1 n.a. 0.044 0.05
true bias assuming 'J is known n.a. -0.232 -0.22
b2 n.a. 0.42 0.67
bias in b2 n.a. 0.42 0.67
IV. Declining TTB
b1 3.26 2.74 2.54
Inferred ca = 1b1 0.30 0.36 0.39
estimated b1 scaled by 'J 4.07 5.48 6.35
i.e. b1
1
'J
Inferred ca = 'Jb1 0.25 0.18 0.16
true bias assuming 'J is known -0.02 -0.09 -0.11
b2 0.10 0.25 0.40
bias in b2 0.10 0.25 0.40
Notes. Each panel reports the coecients of the regression,
Iat
Kat
=  + b1q
a
t + b2
at
Kat
+ "at separately reported in Tables 3, 7,
8 and 9. The scaling of the b1 coecients are based on the values of 'J shown in Table 8. In this Table J denotes TTB in
quarters.
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